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THE ATTORNEY GENERAL:
The Federal Government's Chief Lawyer and
Chief Litigator, or One Among Many?
GRIFFIN B. BELL*
I. INTRODUCTION
I became Attorney General with fixed expectations about the Depart-
ment of Justice. Despite its size and recent history I expected to find a
strong Department with a clear understanding of its place in the nation's
government and a confident vision of its future.
After only a few weeks on the job I began to question my expecta-
tions. Now, well into my second year, I believe I fully' appreciate the
realities of the Department of Justice.
The truth is that the Department of Justice is strong. But it is a
strength born solely of the outstanding individuals who comprise it. The
Department as a whole draws little strength or stability from a clear
conception, either within the Department or elsewhere, of the role that
the Department should play in our federal government. Least of all is
there a clear course charted for the future of the Department.
As Attorney General I am unavoidably caught up in several great
issues: the investigation of Korean influence-buying in Congress, the
investigation of past abuses in the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the
national effort to develop a response to the influx of undocumented
aliens, and several others. But these headline-grabbing issues will pass,
many to become mere footnotes to history. As much as possible without
shortchanging sensitive matters of the immediate moment, I am focus-
ing on the Department of Justice as a whole-past, present, and future.
It is my firm belief that clarifying the position and role of the Depart-
ment of Justice in the order of government is of first importance to the
long-range interests of the nation.
Tonight I want to share some of what I have learned about the
Department, some of my perceptions of its current problems, and some
tentative views on its proper place in our system.
The Department of Justice today has 54,528 employees, including
3,806 attorneys (2,008 in the Justice Department and 1,798 in the
United States Attorney's Offices).' About 92% of our attorneys are
involved in the trial and appeal of lawsuits. The other 300 attorneys
* Attorney General of the United States. This Article is taken from the Eighth Annual John
F. Sonnett Memorial Lecture, delivered by Mr. Bell at the Fordharn University School of Law on
March 14, 1978.
1. See U.S. Dep't of Justice, Legal Activities 2 (1977).
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supervise divisions or offices, render legal advice, consult with Congress
or other departments and agencies regarding legislation, and-to a quite
limited extent-draft and interpret rules and regulations.
Shortly after I took office, the President. asked me to determine the
total number of lawyers in the government and their functions. I learned
that such information had not been gathered in several years, so we
started an inventory of every department and agency in the govern-
ment. We discovered 19,479 lawyers who are performing "lawyer-like"
functions-litigating, preparing legal memoranda, giving legal advice,
and drafting statutes, rules, and regulations. These lawyers are distrib-
uted throughout the departments and agencies, and practically no
agency is too small to have its own "General Counsel."
Some of the 15,673 federal lawyers in government agencies outside
the Department of Justice are handling litigation themselves; some are
involved in direct support of the Justice Department's litigation efforts.
Others are involved in other administrative law functions within their
agencies. About one-fourth of all the federal government's lawyers,
5,247 to be exact, 2 are in the Department of Defense and the military
services where they administer a totally separate court-martial system
under the Uniform Code of Military Justice.
Although I am the chief legal officer in the executive branch, I have
learned that I have virtually no control or direction over the lawyers
outside the Department of Justice, except indirectly in connection with
pending litigation.
II. AUTHORITY OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
AND THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
A. History
It may come as a surprise to many of you, as it did to me, to learn
that the Department of Justice is little more than a century old. For
over eighty years the nation had only an Office of the Attorney
General. This fact alone, and the reasons for it, go far to explain the
absence of strong traditions and clearly defined roles to undergird the
present Department.
The first Congress created the office of Attorney General in the
Judiciary Act of 1789, 3 at the same time it created the federal court
system. The Act called for "a meet person, learned in the law, to act as
attorney-general for the United States," 4 but gave him little power. He
2. This figure includes 3,739 lawyers in uniform.
3. Ch. 20, § 35, 1 Stat. 93 (corresponds to 28 U.S.C. § 503 (1970)).
4. Id.
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was to do nothing more than represent the United States before the
Supreme Court and, upon request, to give opinions on matters of law
to the President and heads of departments.5 Congress also clearly
intended the Attorney General to rank below the heads of the three
departments-War, Foreign Affairs, and Treasury-which existed at
the time. First, it ranked the Attorney General behind them for
succession and protocol purposes. Whereas the salary for the heads of
the Treasury and Foreign Affairs Departments was set at $3,500, that
of the Attorney General was only $1,500.6 And, whereas the depart-
ment heads were given ample staff and quarters, the Attorney General
received nothing beyond his salary-no funds to hire a clerk, purchase
office supplies, or provide for heat or light. He was required to pay all
his expenses himself.
Historians have discerned two motives behind Congress' treatment
of the office of Attorney General. The first was frugality; the new
nation was unsound financially and Congress had to cut corners
wherever possible.7 But the second and perhaps more important
motive for our purposes was fear of a strong Attorney General. 8 Those
early representatives vividly remembered the tyranny that could result
from strong central enforcement of laws, and they hesitated to create
machinery in the executive branch that possibly could serve as an
engine of oppression. Nowhere was this concern more evident than in
the arrangement for the enforcement of penal law and the representa-
tion of the federal government in civil litigation at the trial level. The
Judiciary Act gave the Attorney General no role in either matter,
vesting both powers exclusively in the thirteen United States attor-
neys, 9 then called district attorneys, who were totally independent of
the Attorney General.
The first Attorney General, Edmund Randolph, made his first report
to the President in 1791. In it he sought redress of the very handicaps
that Congress had intentionally placed upon him. He requested author-
ity to participate in litigation in the inferior courts, in order to have
some input into making the records in cases which he eventually would
have to argue in the Supreme Court. He requested authority to
supervise the district attorneys, because they already had shown
tendencies toward uneven enforcement of the laws. And he requested a
clerk to help him with the simple mechanical chores of his office.
5. Id. (corresponds to 28 U.S.C. §§ 511-512 (1970)).
6. J. Easby-Smith, The Department of Justice 5 (1904)
7. See L. Huston, The Department of Justice 9-10 (1967),
8. See id. at 7-8.
9. Ch. 20, § 35, 1 Stat. 92 (1789) (no longer in force).
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President Washington endorsed all three requests and transmitted
them to Congress-where they got nowhere.' 0
The congressional snub of Randolph's recommendations in 1791
established a pattern that was to persist for decades. Seven Attorneys
General had succeeded Randolph before Congress in 1818 finally
appropriated funds for the hire of a clerk.11 Despite renewed recom-
mendations by President Jackson in 1829 and 1830, by President Polk
in 1846, and by President Pierce in 1854. it was not until 1861-a full
seventy years after the first request by Randolph and Washington-
that Congress finally gave the Attorney General some measure of
authority over the district attorneys. 12
The congressional opposition to these requests by successive admin-
istrations illustrates the persistence throughout much of the nineteenth
century of the fear of a strong Attorney General. As the federal
government grew, its legal business grew along with it. There were
periodic attempts by some administrations and some members of
Congress to gain support for the idea of a centralized law department
to handle that legal business. The unfailing reaction of Congress to
each new increment, however, was to create a law officer, usually
known as a Solicitor, in the department generating the legal issues and
put him in control of the resulting litigation with no duty to answer to
the Attorney General. The first Solicitor was created in the Treasury
Department in 1830.13 The next forty years witnessed a steady stream
of such officers-Solicitors for the Navy, for the War Department, for
the State Department, for the Post Office, for Internal Revenue.
As for the Attorney General, the Congress was perfectly willing to
add piecemeal to his duties; for instance, placing him on the Patent
Board, making him a member of the Sinking Fund Commission-
whatever that was, and rerouting executive clemency petitions from
the State Department to him. But Congress refused to authorize any
enlargement of his legal domain. And it was careful to keep the
Attorney General's staff just large enough-some would say too
small-to assist him with his duties already assigned, so there was no
chance of his augmenting his power by asserting de facto control over
legal business where Congress had refused him de jure authority. In
fact, in debates over how to handle increasing federal litigation, those
who opposed the creation of a law department invariably cited the
overworked state of the Attorney General as proof that the new
business could not be lodged with him.
10. J. Easby-Smith, The Department of Justice 6-7 (1904).
11. W. Seymour, United States Attorney 21 (1975).
12. Id. at 22.
13. See A. Langeluttig, The Department of Justice of the United States 5 (1927).
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At some point, of course, the fear of centralized authority had to
dissipate as the memories of legal oppression from the Old World
receded and the federal government increased in power without be-
coming more prone to abuses of the states or individuals in the process.
Added to that development was a growing belief that centralization of
the legal activity of the federal government would be more efficient
and thus cheaper than the system of Solicitors and relatively indepen-
dent district attorneys. That system had effectively broken down under
the continuing press of new business in the 1860's, resulting in the
hiring of numerous outside counsel at considerable expense.
The conjunction of these two threads-acceptance of the idea of
centralization, and a desire for economy-helped to create the De-
partment of Justice in 1870. The debates in Congress at the time
evidence a third reason for the move-the need to insure that the
federal government spoke with one voice in its view of and adherence
to the law. Senator Jenckes of Rhode Island, in explaining the proposal
to the Senate, addressed himself to the existing Solicitors and expressly
spelled out this purpose:
I need not dwell upon the manner in which these officers have performed their
duties. I have no doubt they have performed them to the best of their ability and
honestly in every case. But we have found that there has been a most unfortunate
result from this separation of law powers. We find one interpretation of the laws of the
United States in one Department and another interpretation in another Department. ...
. . . It is for the purpose of having a unity of decision, a unity of jurisprudence, if I
may use that expression, in the executive law of the United States, that this bill
proposes that all the law officers therein provided for shall be subordinate to one
head. 14
The Act establishing the Department of Justice sought to remedy the
problem of divergent executive branch legal views by giving the
Attorney General supervision over the several departmental Solicitors
as well as the district attorneys and any outside counsel employed on
behalf of the United States. Is The position of Solicitor General was
created as an assistant to the Attorney General, as were two positions
of Assistant Attorney General. 16 The Act also gave the Attorney
General and the Department of Justice control of all criminal and civil
litigation in which the United States was interested.' 7
14. Cong. Globe, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 3036 (1870).
15. Act of June 22, 1870, ch. 150, §§ 3, 15-16, 16 Stat. 162, 164 (corresponds to 28 U SC_ §§
518-519, 543 (1970)).
16. Id. § 2, 16 Stat. 162 (corresponds to 28 U.S.C. §§ 505-506 (1970W)
17. Id. § 5, 16 Stat. 162-63 (corresponds to 28 U.S.C. §§ 514-519 (1970))-
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On its face, the Act of 1870 seemed to presage preeminence for the
new Department of Justice and a new era of economy and harmony in
the legal business of the federal government. But two serious over-
sights by Congress at the time effectively doomed from the outset this
attempt to consolidate and rationalize federal legal activity. First,
Congress failed to repeal or modify the statutes establishing the various
Solicitors as independent legal officers and defining their duties. The
1870 Act did state that they now were subject to "supervision" by the
Attorney General, 18 but that is a vague term and the Solicitors
continued to claim their same pre-1870 powers and independence. The
second oversight greatly compounded the difficulties caused by the
first. Congress gave the new Department no building or other quarters
where all of the attorneys under the Attorney General's supervision
could concentrate their offices. The Solicitors stayed in the buildings
housing their old departments, where they were subject to continuing
supervision by the heads of those departments rather than their
nominal new boss, the Attorney General.
Congress was exhibiting a curious ambivalence about the role of the
Attorney General and the Department of Justice, appearing to give
them total control over the nation's legal business on the one hand but
failing to take action necessary to make that control effective on the
other. Within five years of creating the Department of Justice, Con-
gress took three steps that showed it had not been serious about
centralizing all legal activity under the Attorney General. In 1871 and
1872 it created two new Assistant Attorney General positions, but
expressly assigned them to the Interior and Post Office Departments
where they were subject to supervision by the heads of those depart-
ments rather than the Attorney General. And in 1874 Congress
reenacted all of the old laws defining the roles of the Solicitors, with no
attempt to modify their powers so as to subject them to more effective
attorney general control.
The creation of the first independent regulatory agency, the Inter-
state Commerce Commission, in 1887,19 with the express congressional
intent that it not be under the control of the President or the executive
branch, added a new dimension to what Congress intended the role of
the Department of Justice to be. There is some evidence that the
Commission handled most of its cases in the lower courts from the
beginning, and that it cooperated with the Solicitor General in the
presentation of its cases to the Supreme Court. In any event, in 1910
President Taft sent a special message to Congress recommending that
18. Id. § 3, 16 Stat. 162 (no longer in force).
19. Act of February 4, 1887, ch. 104, § 11, 24 Stat. 383 (current version at 49 U.S.C. § II
(1970)).
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all litigation affecting the government be under the control of the
Department of Justice and specifically objecting to the practice of the
Interstate Commerce Commission in employing its own attorneys who,
"while subject to the control of the Attorney-General, act upon the
initiative and under the instructions of the commission." 20 After a
vigorous debate in Congress-centering largely on whether the De-
partment of Justice would have the authority to second-guess the
Commission on the merits-Congress enacted legislation allowing the
Commission to intervene as a part), and, as such, to be represented by
its own attorneys. Justice Department attorneys could therefore oppose
the Commission's attorneys in court, and indeed, that has happened on
a number of occasions, although the Commission and the Solicitor
General have cooperated to file joint briefs in the Supreme Court in
most cases.
During most of the pre-World War I period, however, the Attorney
General was nominally the head of all federal legal activity, but the
Solicitors and their offices retained their actual independence. The
Labor, Commerce, and Agriculture Departments were created, each
with its own Solicitor. And at the Attorney General's suggestion the
two Assistant Attorneys General in the Post Office and Interior De-
partments were made Solicitors in acknowledgment of their real
independence from him.
There was one bright spot for the Attorney General during this
period. In 1886 the last vestige of the earlier concern with downgrad-
ing the Attorney General was removed when the Attorney General was
restored to the fourth rank among Cabinet positions for protocol and
succession purposes. Previously he had ranked behind all other heads
of departments, even those created after the office of Attorney Gen-
eral. 2 1
At the outset of World War I many new agencies were created in the
federal government to meet the emergency situation. Following the lead
of the older departments, these agencies all insisted on their own legal
counsel and authority over their own litigation. Their demands created
enough confusion that the question of the lack of centralized litigating
authority was brought to President Wilson's personal attention. The
result was an Executive order under which all Solicitors and other law
officers were directed to submit to the Attorney General's authority, and
the Attorney General's legal opinions were made binding on all execu-
20. Special Message of the President of the United States on Interstate Commerce and
Antitrust Laws and Federal Incorporation, H.R. Doc. No. 484. 61st Cong.. 2d Sess- 5 (1910).
21. J. Easby-Smith, The Department of Justice 4-5 (1904).
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tive departments zz But this Executive order was promulgated under an
act giving the President temporarily expanded powers for the war effort,
and it expired along with the act six months after the armistice. The
predictable result was an almost immediate return to the status quo
ante, with all Solicitors and other legal officers reasserting their inde-
pendence from the Attorney General.
In 1920, the Interstate Commerce Commission attorneys were
granted statutory authority to appear for the Commission "in any case in
court, '23 and the United States Shipping Board was authorized to
employ attorneys to "represent the board in any case in court. ' 24 In
1921 a Veterans Bureau was established, and its attorneys were given
control over all veterans' litigation.
Before long, different parts of the government again were making
different interpretations of the same laws and again taking inconsistent
positions before the courts. In 1928, the Attorney General in his Annual
Report likened the situation to that which had existed prior to the
creation of the Department of Justice in 1870. He noted that only 115 of
the 90025 legal positions in the executive departments and agencies in
Washington were even nominally under his control. The Attorney Gen-
eral recommended that serious consideration again be given to con-
solidating all legal activities under the chief law officer of the govern-
ment.
26
A few months into his administration, President Franklin Roosevelt
issued an Executive order centralizing all litigating authority in the
Department of Justice and giving the Attorney General the exclusive
right to supervise United States attorneys. 27 Roosevelt's action, like that
of the Congress in 1870 and President Wilson in 1918, resulted from a
perception that decentralized control of the government's legal affairs
had led to chaos and excessive expense.
Roosevelt's effort met the same fate as the two before it. The trend
away from centralized responsibility started again almost immediately.
The Securities and Exchange Commission was established in 193428 and
the National Labor Relations Board in 1935,29 and both were given the
22. Exec. Order No. 2877 (May 31, 1918), reprinted in Key, The Legal Work of the Federal
Government, 25 Va. L. Rev. 165, 190 n.94 (1938).
23. Transportation Act, 1920, ch. 91, § 428, 41 Stat. 492 (current version at 49 U.S C. §
16(11) (1970)).
24. Act of June 5, 1920, ch. 250, § 3, 41 Stat. 990 (repealed 1936).
25. Compared to 3,806 of the 15,740 federal civilian lawyers today.
26. [1928] Att'y Gen. Ann. Rep. 1-2, 347.
27. Exec. Order No. 6166, § 5 (June 10, 1933), reprinted in 77 Cong. Rec. 5707-08 (1933).
28. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, § 4, 48 Stat. 885 (current version at 15 U.S.C. §
78d (1976)).
29. Act of July 5, 1935, ch. 372, § 3(a), 49 Stat. 451 (current version at 29 U.S.C. § 153(a)
(1970)).
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power to conduct their own litigation. The cycle of disintegration and
reform had continued.
The exceptions to centralized litigation authority which were created
during the next thirty-five years mostly involved new independent regu-
latory agencies, although one executive department, the Department of
Labor, also received some independent litigating authority. Agencies
such as the Federal Communications Commission, the Federal Power
Commission (now the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission), the
Federal Maritime Commission, the Atomic Energy Commission (now
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission), and the Equal Employment Op-
portunity Commission were granted at least some degree of independent
litigating authority. Since about 1969-1970, new grants of independent
litigating authority have literally seemed to explode, with authority not
only going to independent agencies such as the Consumer Product
Safety Commission, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, and
the International Trade Commission, but also to some executive branch
agencies such as the Environmental Protection Agency. Today, some
thirty-one separate federal governmental units have or exercise author-
ity to conduct at least some of their own litigation.
B. The Present
The basic statutory scheme today is the same as in 1870: Except as
otherwise authorized by Congress, the conduct of litigation in which the
United States or an agency or officer thereof is a party, or is interested, is
reserved to officers of the Department of Justice, under the direction of
the Attorney General. The problem is the number of exceptions au-
thorized by Congress. Professor John Davis has aptly characterized the
situation as follows:
a continuing effort by Attorneys General to centralize responsibility for all government
litigation in Justice, a continuing effort by many agencies to escape from that control
with respect to civil litigation, and a practice by Congress of accepting the positions of
the Attorneys General in principle and then cutting them to pieces by exceptions. 30
Prosecution of all criminal violations is controlled by the Department of
Justice, and I do not understand that authority to be seriously chal-
lenged; but there is no consistent or rational statutory scheme applicable
to agencies in civil litigation. The curious patchwork of civil litigation
authority cannot be explained in terms of a congressional conception of
the role of the Justice Department. Some grants of separate litigating
authority seem to have been enacted simply because of loud and persis-
tent complaints from the agencies seeking such authority. Others seem
30. Davis, Department of Justice Control of Agency Litigation 17 (Report to the U.S.
Administrative Conference Aug. 14, 1975).
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designed to increase the control of particular congressional committees
or subcommittees over particular agencies or programs. Neither a con-
gressional body which works closely with an agency, nor the agency
itself, wants the Justice Department making decisions counter to its
desires. Fiefdoms have been created, and the Justice Department's
efforts to ensure uniformity in government litigating postures can consti-
tute a real threat to them.
Some recent grants of independent litigating authority have occurred
in strange ways. For example, the litigating authority of the Federal
Trade Commission was significantly enlarged in 1973 by an amendment
on the floor of the Senate tacked onto the Act authorizing the Trans-
Alaska oil pipeline, 3 1 thereby avoiding veto.
I recognize that Congress intended some regulatory agencies and
government corporations to be independent of the executive branch and
the President. That independence has extended to independence from
the Department of Justice in legal matters, including litigation. The
price of such independence is high, as it can and sometimes does result
in two sets of government lawyers opposing each other at taxpayer
expense. More importantly, it requires the judicial branch to decide
interagency disputes that might be resolved more easily and better
through the mediation of the Department of Justice.
I do not favor the independence of these regulatory agencies and
government corporations in legal matters. I think it is unseemly for two
government agencies to sue each other. It requires the judicial branch to
decide questions of government policy, a role never envisioned by our
country's Founding Fathers. It is time-consuming and expensive. I
believe it would be possible to preserve the independence of these bodies
even if they were represented by the Justice Department. Such a system
would be more efficient and would reduce the amount of judicial intru-
sion into intragovernmental disputes. The Department of Justice can
exercise a review and supervisory function in an effort to bring uni-
formity to government legal positions and still recognize the indepen-
dence of the regulatory agencies' enforcement efforts.
My predecessors as Attorney General have shared my view that the
Justice Department should represent the regulatory agencies. To date,
however, Congress has been willing to pay the price of independent
litigating authority for those agencies.
If separate litigating authority is going to continue for independent
regulatory agencies and government corporations, then we should at
least devise a rational system for the conduct of such litigation. One
31. Act of Nov. 16, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-153, § 408. 87 Stat. 591-92 (1973) (current version
at 15 U.S.C. §§ 45(1), 46, 53(b), 56 (1976)).
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agency's case often will affect other regulator, agencies or executive
branch departments. At the least, an agency should be required to alert
the Justice Department in such cases so that the views of the executive
branch could also be presented to the court. If a case could affect the
entire government, such as an employment discrimination claim or a
Freedom of Information Act complaint, the Justice Department should
have control of the litigation rather than the single agency which is party
to the case. The position taken by a single agency on a question of
general concern should not bind the entire federal government.
It is my view that the Justice Department should represent all execu-
tive branch departments and agencies. The Department must, of
course, work closely with its clients in a cooperative effort, recognizing
the peculiar expertise and abilities of agency lawyers and delegating
authority to agency lawyers in certain circumstances, but always retain-
ing final control in the Justice Department.
A study of federal legal offices in 1955 found that the absence of lines
of authority from agency general counsels to the Attorney General
contributed to the diversity of legal positions in the federal government.
The report of that study strongly supported centralized litigation author-
ity in the Department of Justice.
President Carter last August directed his Reorganization Project to
study the way the government's lawyers are used, stating that he con-
siders "the effective use of legal resources to be a vital part of . . . [the]
Administration's effort to improve the performance of the Federal Gov-
ernment .... The President hopes that better use of these resources will
enable the federal government better to comply with its own rules and
regulations and thus prevent unnecessary litigation and administrative
delay. The President stated that he also hoped to improve the procedures
for conducting government litigation in order to ensure more uniform
application of the law. 32
C. Plans for the Future
The President's Reorganization Project is completing its study and
will forward its recommendations to the President in the next few
weeks. This seems a particularly appropriate time to discuss the proper
role of the Department of Justice in the future.
It is clear that the Solicitor General must continue to perform his
current function of representing all the executive departments and the
independent regulatory agencies before the Supreme Court. As counsel
32. In addition to studying the proper allocation of litigation authority, the President's
Reorganization Project is examining several other issues that touch on the future role of the Justice
Department. These include the flow of information between government lawyers, the hiring and
retention of lawyers, and their training.
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for the federal government, the Solicitor General is responsible for
presenting cases to the Supreme Court in the manner which will best
serve the overall interests of the United States. He is also responsible for
deciding whether lower court decisions adverse to the Government
should be appealed, and whether the Government should file amicus
curiae briefs in cases to which it is not a party. During the past term, the
Government filed or supported petitions for writs of certiorari in 107
cases, 76% of which were granted. 33 That percentage should be com-
pared to the percentage of all petitions granted-6%. This reflects the
Solicitor General's careful screening of the Government's cases, and his
skillful advocacy in presenting the Government's views in an accurate
and balanced manner. Last year was not exceptional-over the past
decade, the Supreme Court has reviewed only 6-10% of the cases
presented to it, but taken 60-70% of the Government's cases. 34
The United States is involved in about one-half of the cases decided
on the merits by the Supreme Court each year. 35 The Solicitor General's
overview of all these cases is critical to avoiding inconsistencies in the
Government's positions. His responsibility to the entire government
helps him avoid litigating a significant legal issue with government-wide
impact in a case which, because of its factual or procedural context, is a
poor vehicle. An agency often does not see this broader picture; vindica-
tion in the pending case is often more important to it than the long-range
interests of the United States. Solicitor General Erwin Griswold made
that point in this way:
The Solicitor General's client in a particular case cannot be properly represented before
the Supreme Court except from a broad point of view, taking into account all of the
factors which affect sound government and the proper formulation and development of
the law. In providing for the Solicitor General, subject to the direction of the Attorney
General, to attend to the "interests of the United States" in litigation, the statutes have
always been understood to mean the long-range interests of the United States, not
simply in terms of its fisc, or its success in the particular litigation, but as a government,
as a people. 36
The Solicitor General's screening function is an aid to the Supreme
Court itself because of the large volume of cases filed there. The Court
recognizes and supports this role. Chief Justice Burger sent a letter to
Congress in 1971, on behalf of a unanimous Court, in response to a
33. [1977] Solicitor Gen. Ann. Rep. 2.
34. See Statement of Solicitor General Erwin N. Griswold Concerning Securities Exchange
Act H.R. 5050 Before the Subcomm. on Commerce and Finance of the House Comm. on
Interstate and Foreign Commerce,. 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (June 7, 1973).
35. See [1977] Solicitor Gen. Ann. Rep. table I.
36. The Office of the Solicitor General-Representing the Interests of the United States
Before the Supreme Court 12, Address by Solicitor General Erwin N. Griswold, University of
Missouri Law School (Mar. 14, 1969) (footnote omitted).
1060 [Vol. 46
ATTORNEY GENERAL
congressional inquiry whether the Securities and Exchange Commission
should be empowered to conduct its Supreme Court litigation indepen-
dently of the Solicitor General's Office. The Chief Justice noted the
Solicitor General's "highly important role in the selection of cases to be
brought here" 37 and predicted that diluting the Solicitor General's au-
thority would very likely increase the workload of the Supreme Court.
The various Solicitors General have been careful in the exercise of
their authority, and the Office is well respected by other departments
and agencies for its expertise, independence, and objectivity. Although
Congress has authorized several agencies 38 independently to file peti-
tions for writs of certiorari in certain categories of cases, such separate
petitions have been relatively infrequent, presently averaging one or
two a year. The Solicitor General's Office recognizes that control over
the Government's litigation is not intended to transform the Department
of Justice into a superagency sitting in judgment on the policy decisions
of other departments or agencies. With a few notable exceptions, such
as the antitrust and the civil rights laws and the Freedom of Information
Act, Congress has committed elsewhere the primary responsibility for
most of the policy decisions in the government.
It is my belief that all 3,800 lawyers in the Justice Department can
perform with the same degree of independence, objectivity, and litiga-
tion expertise as the twenty attorneys in the Solicitor General's Office.
Agency lawyers are enmeshed in the daily routine of a specific govern-
ment agency, and cannot be expected to litigate cases with the broad
perspective and objectivity that ensures proper representation of the
best interests of the entire government, and therefore of the people.
Justice Department lawyers have the perspective and objectivity, but
they must take care not to interfere with the policy prerogatives of our
agency clients. An agency's views should be presented to a court unless
they are inconsistent with overall governmental interests, or cannot
fairly be argued.
Agency lawyers are often experts in their own regulator), and en-
forcement programs and statutes, and are often deeply involved in their
37. Statement of Solicitor General Erwin N. Griswold Concerning Securities Exchange Act
H.R. 5050 Before the Subcomm. on Commerce and Finance of the House Comm- on Interstate
and Foreign Commerce, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (June 7, 1973).
38. These include the Federal Communications Commission, the Nuclear Regulatory Com-
mission, the Interstate Commerce Commission, the Federal laritime Commission, the laritime
Administration, and the Secretary of Agriculture (under the Packers and Stockyards Act, 1921,
ch. 64, § 316, 42 Stat. 168 (current version at 7 U.S.C. § 217 (1976)), and the Perishable
Agricultural Commodities Act, 1930, ch. 436, § 11, 46 Stat. 535 (current version at 7 U.S.C.
§ 499k (1976)). In addition, the Tennessee Valley Authority has in some cases represented itself
before the Supreme Court.
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agency's programs. Justice Department lawyers and United States at-
torneys are litigation experts, and perform a critical function in translat-
ing the agency's programmatic expertise into effective briefs and argu-
ments for judges who deal with an almost bewildering variety of cases
and problems involving the federal government.
I recognize that our lawyers must better utilize the expertise of our
client agencies. Since taking office I have recognized that we need to
improve our day-to-day working relationships with other agencies. We
have taken new steps to ensure advance consultation with client agen-
cies before cases can be settled, and to ensure that our client agencies are
properly informed of the progress of pending cases. In short, we have
tried to develop a new sensitivity to treating our client agencies as any
private lawyer would treat a client. To hell) nurture this sensitivity, we
are devising a new system of evaluating the performance of our lawyers
which will include consideration of comments from the agencies they
have represented.
We are considering other steps to more effectively and better serve
our client agencies. A number of agencies feel that the Justice Depart-
ment has not devoted sufficient effort to affirmative enforcement of their
programs because of the demands of an increasingly heavy civil defen-
sive caseload. One way to meet this problem may be the establishment
of a group of attorneys who would litigate only affirmative agency cases.
Overburdened and strained resources continue to be a problem for the
Justice Department, just as they were during our early history. We are
examining ways to better manage the resources we have, including a
better system of dividing civil cases between Washington and the field.
We also have to work with our client agencies to make the most effective
use of our attorneys. For example, every case does not need an agency
lawyer in the field, an agency lawyer in Washington, a Justice Depart-
ment lawyer in Washington, and an assistant United States attorney to
review and agree to the filing of each pleading. More sensible delega-
tions of responsibility simply have to be worked out. As a first step we
are considering significantly increasing the authority of United States
attorneys to settle monetary claims against the Government without first
getting approval from Washington. In keeping with our concern for the
views of our client agencies, however, if the client agency objects to the
proposed disposition we will require review of the matter at a supervis-
ory level of the Justice Department in Washington.
I would like to speak for a moment to another issue related to the
Justice Department's role of representing agencies in litigation. I believe
Justice can and should play a greater role in prelitigation counseling of
other departments and agencies. After all, one of the principal functions
of a lawyer is to "keep all clients out of court"-that is, to advise him or
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her how to accomplish objectives without leaving him or her vulnerable
to suit. This legal counseling role for government agencies is now
generally performed by their own general counsels. Functioning as a
lawyer independent of the agency, the Department of Justice can pro-
vide the agency with a dispassionate view of legal problems associated
with policy objectives. Moreover, as chief litigator for the government,
the Department is able to apply the knowledge and experience it gains in
that arena to anticipate potential legal difficulties presented by agency
activities.
A good example of how that experience has been put to use is in the
area of agency affirmative action efforts. The Department has probed
this complex area of the law through its experience in formulating a
position in the Bakke case, 39 as well as in representing the Department
of Commerce in extensive litigation over the minority business enter-
prise provision of the Public Works Employment Act of 1976.40 By
gaining familiarity with the issues common to all affirmative action
programs, we are able to advise departments or agencies of potential
legal problems. Thus, the experience gained in filing a brief amicus
curiae on behalf of the United States and in representing the Depart-
ment of Commerce might be utilized in advising the Department of
Defense or representing the Labor Department.
Because the Department has become familiar with potential problems
in the affirmative action area, I have brought those questions to the
attention of the various departments and have offered the services of the
Department in advising them on the establishment of such programs.
For example, the Department has taken the position that an affirmative
action program is legally justified if necessary to remedy the effects of
past public and private discrimination. Articulation of such a purpose
will aid a court in evaluating the legality of a program if it is later
challenged. Moreover, we can advise agencies how to tailor their pro-
grams to accomplish their remedial objectives. In this way we hope to
establish a uniform position throughout the government, to enable
agencies to better accomplish their goals and to avoid litigation.
The Freedom of Information Act 4' is another example of a set of legal
principles and public policies which pertain to all federal activities and
which should be interpreted and respected throughout the government
with a fair degree of uniformity. There is a clear need for effective
government-wide coordination to avoid conflicting interpretations by
39. Bakke v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 18 Cal. 3d 34, 553 P2d 1152, 132 Cal. Rptr. 680
(1976), cert. granted, 429 U.S. 1090 (1977).
40. Pub. L. No. 94-369, § 207, 90 Stat. 1007-08 (current version at 42 U.S.C.A. § 6727 (West
Supp. 1978)).
41. 5 U.S.C. §§ 552-559 (1976).
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various government agencies. In 1977 the Justice Department consulted
with other federal agencies over 400 times on Freedom of Information
Act questions not then in litigation, and we feel these efforts make an
important contribution to securing a uniform application of the law.
III. OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL: THE STRUGGLE FOR
POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE
Since 1789, the Attorney General has been charged by statute with
responsibility for providing the President and the heads of departments
with his opinion on questions of law.4 2 With regard to the President,
this responsibility was extended in 1870 to the giving of the Attorney
General's "advice" as well as his opinion on legal questions.
43
Most opinions are rendered on questions that will not ultimately be
resolved by the courts in litigation. Attorneys General have traditionally
declined to render formal legal opinions on questions then in litigation.
These opinions of the Attorney General are generally regarded as au-
thoritative within the executive branch, and they may often have the
salutary effect of avoiding litigation by acting as a check on executive
conduct that may not be in accord with the law.
Historically, Attorneys General have personally approved and signed
their opinions. Until 1950, preparation of those opinions was vested
generally in the Solicitor General or the Assistant Solicitor General. In
1950, the latter position was abolished and the opinion preparation
function was transferred to what is now the Office of Legal Counsel,
headed by an Assistant Attorney General. In addition to preparing his
formal legal opinions, that Office, acting for the Attorney General,
renders legal advice and opinions to the executive branch and agencies
on a daily basis under the same rules as are followed with respect to
formal opinions of the Attorney General.
44
The increased complexity of our society and the government's rela-
tionship to it over the past several decades is reflected in the opinion-
giving functions performed by the Attorney General and his subordi-
nates. Today, the subject matter encompassed by that function is as
broad as the activities of the government itself. It is not overstatement to
say that, in this complex society, the need for sound legal advice in
42. See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 35, 1 Stat. 93 (corresponds to 28 U.S.C. §§ 511-512
(1970)).
43. Act of June 22, 1870, ch. 150, § 14, 16 Stat. 164 (corresponds to 28 U.S.C. § 511 (1970)).
44. Formal opinions of the Attorney General have been published in the past. We are now
preparing for publication the first volume which will contain the separate opinion letters and
memoranda of the Office of Legal Counsel as well as the formal Attorney General opinions.
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advance of governmental action has become particularly acute. There is
no substitute for doing something right the first time.
Another important objective-and one perhaps more difficult to
achieve-furthered by the opinion function is ensuring that the many
diverse agencies of government speak with one voice on the man), legal
issues that cut across the responsibilities of more than one department or
agency. In the past, the reconciling of interagency disputes regarding
questions of law arising in litigation has often not taken place until
specific cases were brought to the attention of the Solicitor General after
a decision by a federal district court on the question involved. Where no
litigation is involved, the opinion function may serve and has served to
harmonize diverse legal opinions and to ensure that the government acts
legally.
As we examine what the role of the Department of Justice should be
in the future, we must consider the fact that in recent years there
has been a frequent voicing of the idea of an "independent" Attorney
General. This concept encompasses the entire Department of Justice
and contemplates some kind of formal measures to insulate it from
executive branch pressures in carrying out its law-defining and law-
enforcing responsibilities. The currency of this "independence" move-
ment is partly due to the Watergate experience. Many people called
not only for a cleansing of the Department but for the removal of the
potential for abuse forevermore. In 1976, President Carter made the
subject one of national debate by proposing during his campaign that
the Attorney General be appointed for a term of between five and
seven years, with removal occurring only upon congressional and
presidential approval.
Discussions about the role of the Attorney General and his need for
independence from policy matters are not new to the political scene.
From the inception of the office of the Attorney General in the Judiciary
Act of 1789,4 5 there has been ambiguity about the role, and disagree-
ment about the independence, of the Attorney General. The Judiciary
Act described the functions of the office in terms seemingly without
relation to the policymaking, politically-rooted tasks of the rest of the
executive branch:
to prosecute and conduct all suits in the Supreme Court in which the United States
shall be concerned, and to give his advice and opinion upon questions of law when
required by the President of the United States, or when requested by the heads of any of
the departments, touching any matters that may concern their departments .... 46
45. Ch. 20, § 35, 1 Stat. 93 (corresponds to 28 U.S.C. § 503 (1970)).
46. Id. (corresponds to 28 U.S.C. §§ 509, 511 (1970)).
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The opinion-giving responsibility of the Attorney General was for
"questions of law" only. Moreover, President Washington's letter to
Edmund Randolph urging him to become Attorney General indicates he
was seeking a skilled, neutral expounder of the law rather than a
political adviser:
The selection of the fittest characters to expound the laws, and dispense justice, has been
the invariable object of my anxious concern. I mean not to flatter when I say that
considerations like these have ruled in the nomination of the attorney general of the
United States, and that my private wishes would be highly gratified by your accep-
tance.
4 7
Notwithstanding those noteworthy independent beginnings, our At-
torneys General soon came to know the tensions created when the
independence of their deliberations came in conflict with the policy
preferences of the Presidency. Senator George H. Williams, who himself
later became Attorney General, described such a clash during the con-
troversy in 1830 over the national bank:
Consulting with his Attorney General, [President Jackson] found that some doubts were
entertained by that officer as to the existence of any law authorizing the Executive to
[designate certain banks to be depositories of U.S. funds], whereupon Old Hickory said
to him, "Sir, you must find a law authorizing the act or I will appoint an Attorney
General who will."
48
This tension between the Attorney General's role as one who dis-
passionately defines the legal limits of executive action and the presi-
dential desire to receive legal advice facilitating certain policy decisions
has been manifested in modern administrations as well.
In 1940, President Roosevelt determined to provide the British with
fifty destroyers in exchange for long-term leases on British territory in
the western hemisphere. However, the United States had in 1939 pro-
claimed its neutrality, which potentially barred such an exchange. As a
result, three legal questions were posed to then Attorney General Robert
H. Jackson:
(a) Could the President acquire the leases by an executive agreement between himself
and the British Prime Minister, or must the agreement be submitted to the Senate as a
treaty ... ? (b) Did the President have the authority to dispose of the 50 destroyers, and
if so, on what conditions? (c) Did the statutes of the United States forbid delivery of such
war vessels by reason of the belligerent status of Great Britain?
4 9
47. L. Huston, A. Miller, S. Krislov & R. Dixon, Roles of the Attorney General of the United
States 44 (1968).
48. Id. at 51. There is some doubt as to whether this incident actually occurred. See H.
Cummings & C. McFarland, Federal Justice 109-10 (1937).
49. L. Huston, A. Miller, S. Krislov & R. Dixon, Roles of the Attorney General of the United
States 57 (1968).
[Vol. 461066
ATTORNEY GENERAL
Although each of these issues was difficult, Jackson stated in an opinion
issued on August 27, 1940, that the President could make the exchange
without seeking Senate approval, 0 and the exchange was made. But a
respectable, though by no means unanimous, body of legal opinion in
the United States thought that Jackson had gone too far in accommodat-
ing the law to the exigencies of politics.
A somewhat different example of limited independence of an Attor-
ney General is reported in Francis Biddle's account of the internment of
American Japanese in World War II. Biddle, Attorney General under
Roosevelt, stated that at the time of the internment proposal he thought
the program "ill-advised, unnecessary, and unnecessarily cruel." 5 '
However, he did not so advise the President, and the Justice Depart-
ment subsequently defended the action successfully before the Supreme
Court. Biddle explained that he "was new to the Cabinet, and disin-
clined to insist on my view to an elder statesman [Secretary of War
Stimson] whose wisdom and integrity I greatly respected." 5 2
A final illustration of the pressures on an Attorney General when a
President seeks a legal opinion on a course of action he deems to be
necessary occurred during the 1962 Cuban missile crisis. President
Kennedy had decided to take action, but there was concern as to
whether a detention and search of Soviet ships carrying arms to Cuba
would be interpreted as a blockade, an act of war. If the ship searches
could be considered a quarantine, they would qualify as a legitimate
defensive measure. Because of time pressures, the opinion was ham-
mered out in oral discussions between Justice and State Department
lawyers. Notwithstanding serious questions of international and con-
stitutional law, the opinion was favorable to the President's wishes.5 3
This difficulty regarding independence is due in part to the multifa-
ceted nature of the Attorney General's job. The Attorney General has a
variety of responsibilities: to prosecute violations of federal law; to
represent the United States in judicial proceedings, either as lawyer for
client agencies and departments or as amicus in cases of national impor-
tance; to provide legal opinions on questions submitted by other de-
partments and agencies; to provide requested comment on pending
legislation; to propose and steer Justice Department legislation through
the Congress; and to advise the President on the appointment of federal
judges and prosecutors. These tasks and responsibilities require varying
degrees of contact and coordination with the executive branch on the
one hand, and independence from the executive branch on the other.
50. Id. at 57-58.
51. Id. at 55.
52. Id. at 56.
53. Id. at 59.
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Thus, the independence of the Attorney General has only a general and
uneven tradition to support it, and a complexity that resists easy resolu-
tion.
The executive branch inevitably encounters legal questions arising
out of its policy formulation and implementation alternatives. As a
matter of good government, it is desirable generally that the executive
branch adopt a single, coherent position with respect to the legal ques-
tions that arise in the process of government. Indeed, the commitment
of our government to due process of law and to equal protection of the
laws probably requires that our executive officers proceed in accordance
with a coherent, consistent interpretation of the law, to the extent that it
is administratively possible to do so. It is thus desirable for the President
to entrust the final responsibility for interpretations of the law to a single
officer or department. The Attorney General is the one officer in the
executive branch who is charged by law with the duties of advising the
others about the law and of representing the interests of the United
States in general litigation in which questions of law arise. The task of
developing a single, coherent view of the law is entrusted to the President
himself, and by delegation to the Attorney General. That task is consis-
tent with the nature of the office of Attorney General.
Moreover, with a few rather significant exceptions, the Attorney
General is removed from the policymaking and policy implementation
processes of government, and this is especially true when he deals with
legal questions that arise in the administration of departments other
than his own. It makes sense to assign the task of making definitive legal
judgments to an officer who is not required, as a general matter, to play
a decisive role in the formulation of policy. Such an officer enjoys a
comparative advantage over policymakers in the discharge of the law-
giv ihg function.
Therefore, some have suggested that the independence of the Attor-
ney General should be increased and secured institutionally, within the
limits imposed by the Constitution. It has been suggested that an
Executive order could be issued that would endorse the concept that the
Attorney General must be free to exercise independent judgment in his
litigating function and in his counseling function, subject only to the
constitutional prerogatives of the President. Such an order could pro-
vide that the Attorney General's opinions on questions of law, as op-
posed to questions of policy, would be binding in certain circumstances.
It could establish removal procedures that would require the President to
justify the removal of an Attorney General because of differences of
opinion over questions of law. It might also include an expiration
provision, terminating the order on the inauguration of President Car-
ter's successor, but the order could be a model for future administra-
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tions. I haven't reached any conclusions as to whether I would recom-
mend to President Carter that he issue such an Executive order. How-
ever, as we discuss and decide the future role of the Department of
Justice, careful consideration must be given to this problem.
In the Bakke case54 and in some other instances, I have played an
important role as a buffer between our truly independent litigating
lawyers in the Department of Justice, including the Solicitor General
and his staff, and other government officials outside the Department of
Justice. In these specific instances, I think I have been successful in
preserving the independent positions taken by our Justice Department
lawyers. A refined definition of the Attorney General's role in such
disputes is something that is clearly needed as we decide our charter for
the future.
IV. CONCLUSION
I have mentioned a number of important questions tonight that
deserve careful consideration as we reexamine what the roles of the
Attorney General and the Department of Justice should be in the future.
Although our client is the government, in the end we serve a more
important constituency: the American people. As the President seeks to
make our increasingly complex federal government more responsive to
the needs of the people, we must improve the performance of the
government's lawyers, including those in the Department of Justice. I
hope we can do that in part by developing a clear concept of just what
the roles of the Attorney General, the Justice Department, and indeed,
the government lawyer, should be.
We covered a lot of history tonight. I don't know if you've been as
fascinated listening to the history of the Department as I have been in
researching it and telling the story. I must share one little tidbit with you
as an aside. I was very pleased to learn that the Attorney General when
the Department of Justice was created, A. T. Akerman, was from
Georgia. I admit that I subsequently discovered that he was born in
New Hampshire, but he moved to Georgia at an early age and grew up
there. While that rather significant fact doesn't have much to do with
tonight's speech, it was an important discovery for an amateur Georgia
historian. His lack of fame in Georgia is no doubt the result of his
having been appointed Attorney General by President Grant shortly
after what we in the South sometimes call the War of Northern Aggres-
sion.
54. Bakke v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 18 Cal. 3d 34, 553 P.2d 1152, 132 Cal. Rptr. 680
(1976), cert. granted, 429 U.S. 1090 (1977).
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